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And so we might go on testing all manner of entities in living nature, from toadstools to leagues of nations, by the criterion here employed; and if the testing were always done thoroughly and wisely it would always bring the tested case into somewhat clearer light.

WILLIAM E. RITTER

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Lectures on Modern Idealism. JOSIAH ROYCE. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. xii+266.

In this modest work I feel that we have Royce at his best, engaged in the task in which he was happiest, the task of exposition, and in the field where it is perhaps the most difficult. One thinks always of the beginning student of philosophy as beset by the suspicion that, if the philosopher he is studying knew what he was talking about he would discover that he was talking about—nothing whatever; nothing, at any rate, that means anything for other persons or for common sense. I find myself beset by the same suspicion regarding those who fail to interest me. But I have been too often mistaken not to admit the possibility that there may be no philosophy without some basis in common experience, or in possible experience, if only we could find the peculiar angle of experience from which it was, or (just as good) might have been, written. In such discoveries, such sympathetic interpretations, even if at times a little overdrawn, Royce was especially happy. He was ingenious in showing how the most abstruse problems of philosophy stand for difficulties inherent in common experience. And always to the credit of philosophy; for in his view the philosopher is not merely the plain man with a trifling difference of vocabulary, but rather, with all of his vagueness and confusion, the plain man become really alive and intelligent.

These ten lectures form the chapters of a coherent work, constituting a history of modern idealism, and an analysis of the dialectical movement, through Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Thus they cover the ground already covered in Royce's *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. "To literary distinction such as *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* possesses," says Dr. Loewenberg in his editorial preface, "the present lectures can evidently lay no claim. In range and depth, however, they far surpass the chronicle of the same period in the earlier volume." For myself, I prefer the style of the *Lectures*, as somewhat more sober and more congenial to the

serious reader, while retaining the geniality and ease of manner which made Royce always companionable reading. The book is just the sort of book to which I should direct the layman or scholar in other fields seeking to learn the meaning of German idealism; and incidentally it strikes me as possibly an excellent reading-book or textbook.

It is unnecessary to follow the course of the argument. Two points may, however, be worth noting. First, Royce will make it clear that the fundamental presupposition and *leitmotif* of the idealistic movement, from Kant's deduction of the categories to Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, is just the fact and meaning of consciousness; or, in equivalent terms, of self-consciousness, self, the person. Thus the whole process of dialectic, however remote it may seem from the world of common reality, is really an attempt to lay bare the constitution and the implications of a plain psychological fact. The most fantastic aspects of the movement only reflect the complications of this fact. Royce spends several pages in demonstrating, in partial vindication of Schelling, that paradox and contradiction are inseparable from any process of intelligence. Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, he tells us, is, in one aspect, "a study of human nature, as it is expressed in various individuals and social types. From this point of view the title which William James has employed for his book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, could well be adapted to characterize Hegel's treatise. It is so far a book describing, in serial order, some varieties of experience which, in Hegel's opinion, are at once characteristic of the general evolution of the higher mental life, and are examples of the transition from common sense naïveté to philosophical reflection" (p. 139). Again, the *Phaenomenologie* may be viewed as the biography of the world-spirit—the life of the world-spirit consisting of a series of stages which may be compared to different incarnations or migrations. And the Absolute—essentially a social conception, bound up with a practical social philosophy—is the society of spirits, yet also itself a spirit, the spirit of spirits, the consciousness of consciousnesses necessary to make each consciousness a finally conscious fact.

The metaphysical presupposition of all idealism is, therefore, that to be is to be conscious, or to be a person, or a self. Are you seeking reality? Well, here am I. I am real. Nothing is more real. And whatever you can find in me will be what you seek. This humanistic prejudice, if it be such, furnishes the foundation for the idealistic logic and the source and explanation of the exclusive identification of the real with the rational. It is then interesting to note Royce's careful statement that even for Hegel

the real was not quite exclusively the rational. For in Hegel's view there is found always, after reason has done its best, a certain residuum of the opaque and the fortuitous. Royce makes this explanation, not as an admission that Hegel lacked the courage of his prejudice, but rather as a vindication of Hegel's sanity and common sense. But it would be interesting to learn what bearing this should have upon our final estimate of the value and function of Hegel's philosophy; and of the philosophy of Royce.

The other point to be mentioned is Royce's showing that these absolute idealists were all pragmatists—though none the less absolutists. Readers of Royce will recall the pragmatic strain introduced into his own philosophy by the refusal to separate intelligence and will. But what interests me most in this connection, though the observation ought not to be novel, is the similarity, amounting to identity, between Dewey's functional theory of consciousness and the Hegelian dialectic. For both views it seems that the function of consciousness is simply to resolve older difficulties and conflicts while creating newer ones on a higher level, and for both the distinction of subject and object is the product of this function; and the question is suggested, whether the functional theory of consciousness was a discovery of biology or of dialectic.

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Nietzsche, sa Vie et sa Pensée: Les Précurseurs de Nietzsche.

CHARLES ANDLER. Paris: Editions Bossard. 1920. Pp. 384.

The professor of German literature at the Sorbonne gives us here the first instalment of a comprehensive work on Nietzsche—the most comprehensive yet essayed. It is to be completed in five later volumes, entitled as follows: *La Jeunesse de Nietzsche (jusqu'à la rupture avec Bayreuth)*; *Nietzsche et le Pessimisme esthétique*; *Nietzsche et le Transformisme intellectuel*; *La Maturité de Nietzsche (jusqu'à sa mort)*; and *La dernière Philosophie de Nietzsche (le renouvellement de toutes les valeurs)*. Volumes II, III and IV may be expected soon—they are in press; Volumes V and VI are in active preparation. The present volume had just gone to press "at the hour of the battle of the Marne" (1914); very properly, then, it is dedicated to the memory of M. Andler's colleague, M. Robert Gauthiot, and of twenty-two of his pupils, "*germanistes Français*, who gave their lives for their country, and for the European civilization in which, as they always believed, the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven and Nietzsche must recover its place." Moreover, the Dedication gives the clue to M. Andler's standpoint, that of the Good European.

Even were M. Andler not the author, it is palpable that this would